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old rule. But even were Ohio courts in general to espouse one or both
of these limitations the Ohio employer would still stand to gain more
protection through the use of an express covenant than by reliance upon
an implied covenant, as the latter has been restricted in Curry v.
Marquart.41  JOHN R. YOUNG
4' 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E. (2d) 868 (1938).
TRUSTS
RESERVATION OF POWERS IN A LIVING TRUST
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized the validity of living
trusts in a recent case which represents a complete reversal of the court's
former attitude toward these devices.' Due to the great number of living
trusts now existing in this state, as well as elsewhere, and to the great
degree of convenience that may be achieved through the continued rec-
ognition thereof, a discussion of the development of the problem in Ohio
does not seem inappropriate. To attempt a review of all the decisions
in this country dealing with the subject would result in a work too
lengthy for the purposes for which this article is intended. This dis-
cussion, therefore, shall be directed chiefly to the development of the
law in Ohio and references to authority outside the state shall be made
only for the purpose of comparison and contrast.
In October of 1913, one Thomas H. White conveyed certain real
and personal property to the Cleveland Trust Co., giving the trust com-
pany broad powers in the matter of investment and reinvestment and
unrestricted power to manage as if the absolute owner, but retaining for
himself the net income for life and such of the principal as the trustee
should deem necessary. White was to have free use of the realty and
was to pay the taxes thereon, was to have the right to demand from
the trustee a transfer of voting rights in certain stocks, and was to have
the right, subject to the trust company's approval, to revoke the trust.
The agreement further stipulated that after the death of White the
property was to be held in trust for certain named individuals. On the
same day, White executed a will devising all of the property to the trust
company to be disposed of according to the terms of the trust agreement.
Mr. White died in 1914. In January of 1934, the trust company
brought an action under section 10504-66 of the General Code for a
construction of the so-called trust agreement. The Common Pleas court
of Cuyahoga County held the trust agreement was testamentary in
1 Clmeland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. z, IS N.E. (2d) 627 (1938).
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character which in legal effect created a mere agency that was termi-
nated by the death of Thomas H. White. Two of the interested bene-
ficiaries perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 8th District
and procured a ruling that the powers reserved to the settlor were not
inconsistent with the validity of the trust.2 Upon granting of a motion
therefor, the case was certified to the Supreme Court which affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Zimmerman, an-
nounced the proposition that an otherwise effective trust was not ren-
dered nugatory by the reservation to the settlor of the following rights
and powers: (i) The use of the property and the income therefrom
for life; (2) the supervision and direction of investments and reinvest-
ments; (3) the amendment or modification of the trust agreement;
(4) the revocation of the trust in whole or in part; (5) the consump-
tion of principle. Relying on sections 57 and 361 of the Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, the court said that if an effective trust was created
during the settlor's lifetime the disposition did not become testamentary
because there was to be no application of the property until after his
death. "One who constructs a valid present trust, providing for a life
estate in himself with a further trust in favor of other beneficiaries on
his death, grants to such beneficiaries an immediate equitable title in
remainder, and the arrangement is not of a testamentary nature."'
Such a holding is unexpected in view of two earlier rulings of the
Ohio Supreme Court in which a contrary doctrine was announced. The
first of these cases was Worthington, 4dmr. v. Redkey.4 In that case,
the settlor, by a writing, transferred to a trustee a sum of money, "in
trust," to be distributed to certain named charities after his death and
reserved to himself the power of revocation. On the same day he made
a will leaving out the legatees named in the trust agreement. In holding
the trust invalid, Chief Justice Davis said that "if the money has not
irrevocably passed out of his control to the donees, or to a trustee for
them, then this writing is, at best, no more than an ineffectual testa-
mentary disposition." 5 At the time this case was decided, there existed
sufficient authority elsewhere in the United States to justify the court in
reaching the opposite conclusion,' and with the exception of an apparent
inconsistency among the decisions in Massachusetts and one or two other
cases, noted hereafter,' the majority of American jurisdictions have
'Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 6zg (1937).
' Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. i, i5 N.E. (2d) 627 at pp.7-8.
'Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. z'1 (1912).
'lbid., at pp. 135-6.
"Stone v. Hackett, iz Gray 227 (Mass. z858)j Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 At!.
809 (xS9i); Brown v. Spohr, 18o N.Y. 201, 73 N.E. s4 (904.).
See note 16, infra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 27I
adopted a rule contra to that of the Redkey case, a rule announced in
the leading case of Stone v. Hackett."
At the time of the Redkey decision, the trust companies in Ohio were
administering a great many living trusts the validity of which would be
denied if ever tested in the courts on the basis of the Redkey case. To
avoid this contingency, the trust companies exerted sufficient pressure
on the legislature to secure an amendment to section 8617 of the Gen-
eral Code. At the time the Redkey case was decided, that section read:
"All deeds of gifts and conveyances of goods and chattels, made in trust
to the use of the person or persons making them, shall be void and of
no effect."' In 1921, an amendment became effective which provided
that a trust for the exclusive use of the creator was void but that the
creator could reserve to himself "any use of power, beneficial or in
trust, which he might lawfully grant to another, including the power
to alter, amend or revoke such trust, and such trust shall be valid as to
all persons,"'" except that any beneficial interest reserved could be
reached by creditors and that creditors could compel the exercise of the
power of revocation "to the same extent and under the same conditions
that such creator could have exercised the same."" Since this amend-
ment made only trusts for the exclusive use of the creator void, if the
trust provided that the property go to another after the death of the
settlor it was not for the exclusive use of the settlor and therefore not
void, and an entering wedge was created whereby the court could mod-
ify its ruling in the Redkey case.
The first test of the effect of this amendment came in 1928 in the
case of Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins. There the settlor delivered to the
trust company certain property and reserved to herself the net income,
and the right to alter, to withdraw the principal and to revoke. By a
supplemental agreement, made subsequent to the amendment of section
8617, she disposed of the property after her death. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court held that, since the settlor
reserved the right to modify and revoke, there was not, at common law,
a full and complete transfer and that the transaction was testamentary
in character, basing the decision on the authority of the Redkey case. On
rehearing, however, this opinion was withdrawn and another opinion
substituted therefor in which the trust was held valid on the basis of
section 8617 as amended. 2 In his second opinion in the case, Marshall
' Supra, note 6.
'Ohio G. C., sec. 8617 (19z).
10 Ohio 0. C., sec. 8617 (1939).
"lAIbd.
21 Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, izz Ohio St. ix9, 167 N.E. 389 (1930). For a
more detailed discussion of this case, see Rowley, in 3 Cin. L. Rev. 36z (r929).
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held to his common law view and decided in favor of the validity of the
trust only on the basis of the statute. He said that the words contained
in the amended statute, "and such trust shall be valid as to all persons,"
were susceptible of the interpretation that the trust was valid as to heirs
and next of kin, and that it might operate as a devolution of property
after death without being executed with the formalities of a will. "It is
quite certain that it has been so regarded and trust agreements have been
made since that amendment to such an extent as to have become a rule
of property. Large estates have been distributed on the faith of their
validity and in accordance with the expressed wish of the creators. These
distributions should not be disturbed at this time upon a doubtful inter-
pretation of ambiguous legislation."' 3 Although a somewhat strained
construction of the statute was applied, a desirable and convenient result
was reached.
Bearing in mind, then, the early denial of the validity of such trusts
as seen in the Redkey case, along with the fact that but for section 8617
the validity would have been denied again in the Hawkins case, the result
in the recent White case is surprising, particularly if considered in the
light of certain statements made by Judge Zimmerman. "Certain lan-
guage in the Hawkins case, unnecessary to a decision on the ground
adopted by the court, (the statute) is to the effect that in the absence
of a statute permitting it, a valid trust cannot be recognized where the
settlor reserves the right of revocation. Such expression is opposed to the
rule announced by all the courts of last resort in other jurisdictions which
have spoken on the subject, and cannot be regarded as controlling in
Ohio, irrespective of Sec. 8617.5' 14 So the court has swung around from
the Hawkins case and has adopted the view of Stone v. Hackett, thereby
virtually overruling the Redkey case.
Judge Zimmerman has, in the opinion of the writer, announced a
desirable doctrine and one which is amply supported by reputable Amer-
ican authority."5 Living trusts provide a convenient method for the
Is bid., p. ISo.
'* Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, I34 Ohio St. I, x5 N.E. (zd) 627 at p. it.
' In jurisdictions outside Ohio there seems to be little trouble in holding trusts valid
where the settlor has reserved only the income for life and a power of revocation. But as
other powers are reserved, the problem becomes more difficult and it becomes a question of
degree whether the settlor has created a trust or a mere agency. The cases in any one
jurisdiction are, however, fairly consistent, with the exception of Massachusetts where
there exists an apparent inconsistency. Although Massachusetts is the jurisdiction of Stone
v. Hackett, that court held in McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, zox Mass. o,
87 N.E. 463 (i909) that the retention by the settlor of the right to be paid such sums as
she should demand during her life and the retention of the power to revoke, coupled with
a general absence of powers in the named trustee, makes the disposition after the death
of the settlor invalid as testamentary. This is a leading case on reservations sufficient to
defeat a trust and is relied on and followed in Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co.,
183 Wis. x56, s96 N.W. 8z9 (1924). It is, however, difficult to reconcile withcthe Massa-
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handling and devolution of property, and since creditors are sufficiently
protected by the provision in section 8617 permitting them to compel a
revocation, there would seem to be no objection to recognizing them.
JAMES F. BELL, JR.
chusetts cases of Davis v. Ney, :Sa Mass. 59o (1878) where a trust was held valid where
the settlor reserved the right to draw such sums as he should desire during his lifetime,
this power being treated the same as power to revoke, and with Jones v. Old Colony
Trust Co., zhi Mass. 309, 146 N.E. 716 (1925) where validity was upheld even though
the settlor reserved the power to revoke, modify or change. The only possible distinction
between the cases is that drawn by the Jones case on the ground that the "nominal trus-
tee' in the McEvoy case had none of the ordinary powers of the trustee and was in
substance and effect only an agent of the donor. Aside from the situation in Massachu-
setts, there are few inconsistencies and there appears to be a definite trend toward the rule
applied in the White case and in Stone v. Hackett. For a carefully studied review of most
of the American cases on this subject, see 38 Yale L.J. 1135 ('99) and 73 A.L.R. 209
(93).
